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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN G. MATIEVITCH, 
Appellant, 
— vs.— 
HERCULES POWDER COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Respondent. 
rCase No. 8281 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
After due consideration of the pleadings, plaintiff's 
deposition, affidavits filed by both parties, oral argu-
ments and written briefs filed below, Judge Van Cott of 
the Third Judicial District entered a Summary Judgment 
dismissing plaintiff's action against the Hercules Powder 
Company, respondent. Defendant was the manufacturer 
of the dynamite and blasting caps, the explosion of which 
had injured plaintiff. 
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There was no dispute below as to the evidence. 
Plaintiff concedes in his briefs "that there is no direct 
evidence to show how the defendant was negligent in the 
manufacture of the caps and dynamite." The sole issue 
below, which is the genuine issue here on appeal, is the 
legal question of whether on the basis of plaintiff's own 
statement of the evidence in this particular case, the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could be invoked to permit 
inference of defendant's negligence, and so take the case 
to the jury. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since the particular facts determine whether as a 
matter of law the specific occurrance will itself bespeak 
of negligence, a more detailed reference to the record 
before the court below than was presented by appellant's 
brief is deemed essential. In so stating these facts it is 
to be remembered that the basic question on appeal is 
the District Court's decision that these facts, favorably 
construed for plaintiff and absent any genuine issue 
with respect thereto, as a matter of law required the 
equivalent of a directed verdict for defendant or the sus-
taining of a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint if such 
facts had been properly pleaded, under the old practice. 
What, then, are these facts ? 
1. Defendant's manager, L. W. Early, made affidavit 
as follows (R. 10-11) : 
2 
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3. That said defendant company for many 
years has and now is engaged in the business of 
manufacturing explosives, including dynamite and 
blasting caps. That the dangerous nature of dy-
namite and particularly of blasting caps is well 
known. That such products are packed by the de-
fendant in containers marked with warning signs 
of the dangerous nature of the product. That in 
each case of dynamite and blasting caps as manu-
factured and produced by defendant, written 
warnings and instructions as to use are inserted, 
a copy of which is attached hereto and by refer-
ence is made a part hereof. 
4. That such products are sold wholesale by 
defendant to jobbers or distributors, and in some 
instances are sold direct to major consumers of 
such dynamite and blasting caps. That for many 
years defendant has known that its dynamite and 
blasting caps had been used by the Portland Ce-
ment Company, operator of the Le Grande Quarry 
in Parley's Canyon, Utah. 
5. That said Portland Cement Company was 
the employer of plaintiff, who was injured at said 
quarry on the 9th day of January, 1951. That 
at times said Portland Cement Company has pur-
chased and used the dynamite and blasting caps 
of manufacturers other than defendant, together 
with fuses purchased from others. That defend-
ant does not manufacture or sell the fuse which 
is used to ignite the blasting caps. That the use 
of dynamite, blasting caps and fuse and the opera-
tion and control of the said Le Grande Quarry 
at all times has been and is under the exclusive 
direction of said Portland Cement Company as 
owner and operator thereof. 
3 
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6. That the inherent nature of blasting caps 
is such that they will readily detonate or explode 
unless at all times carefully handled and protected 
from heat, shock, pressure or contact with rock, 
metal or other hard substances. 
2. Plaintiff's fellow-employee, W. W. Harwood, 
made affidavit that he knew that the caps and powder 
being used by plaintiff on the day of the accident (Jan-
uary 9, 1951) were of defendant's manufacture, having 
been so marked on the containers in the Portland Cement 
Company's powder house from which the particular caps 
and powder were removed by plaintiff for use on that 
day (paragraphs 7 and 10, K. 16). 
3. There is no dispute as to these facts; or as to 
the accident itself. We quote from plaintiff's own deposi-
tion, plaintiff being the sole witness as to these facts 
(deposition pages 1 to 19, R. 24 to 42): 
"JOHN G. MATIEVITCH, plaintiff herein, 
called as a witness at the instance and request of 
the defendant, being first duly sworn, testified as 
follows: 
Q. What year, or about when did you become 
employed by the Utah Portland Cement Com-
pany? 
A. Well, sir, it was 1936. 
4 
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• • • 
Q. Now, John, can you describe briefly what 
your work on the powder would be, in terms that 
some of us who are not in that work can under-
stand? What would you do? 
A. How I had to do it? 
Q. Yes. What were your duties ? 
A. I was a powderman, loading holes. 
Q. Can you describe the holes ? 
A. Well, the drill men drill the holes; then 
we powdermen load them. Do you want to know 
how they are loaded? 
Q. You wouldn't drill the holes, is that i t! 
A. One day I would be powderman and two 
days a drillman; wTe changed; there were three of 
us up there. 
Q. There were three on the crew, is that 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Approximately what are the dimensions 
of those holes? 
A. They varied. 
Q. They vary in depth you mean ? 
A. Yes; some would be different. 
5 
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Q. Are they drilled by a pneumatic type of 
drill, or what kind of drill do you use ? 
A. What we had been using there? All dif-
ferent types of drills up there, 18 inch and there 
was a three-footer. It depends on the boulder; 
you have to use your own judgment. 
Q. You were drilling boulders that had been 
blasted from the face of the quarry? 
A. Yes, the bottom would be covered up; the 
shovel would dig some of them out and put them 
on the side for us to drill. 
Q. Those are large boulders that had been 
blasted from the face of the quarry, is that right? 
A. Yes; they vary, them boulders. 
Q. They are large boulders that have been 
blasted from the face ? 
A. Yes, that has been blasted. 
Q. Then they have to be broken up, is that 
right? 
A. If they are too big for the crusher. 
Q. Is that called secondary blasting? 
A. I guess so, yes. 
Q. You and your fellow employes would drill 
the holes and then put in the powder, is that cor-
rect? 
A. There would be two drills; one day the 
powderman would be doing the loading; the drill-
men wouldn't be doing nothing but just do their 
drilling. 
6 
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Q. The depth of those holes would depend on 
the particular boulder, is that correct? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Then after the drilling then the charge is 
put in, is that correct? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. By the powderman? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. How would that be done! Would you 
describe that? 
A. Well, we would fold the blasting cap. (in-
dicating) 
Q. Like a fishhook! 
A. Yes, until we fold it over, (indicating) 
Q. This end? (indicating) 
A. Yes, that is, of the blasting cap; then put 
it in the drill hole. 
Q. Then would you put the powder on top of 
it? 
A. You would slit the powder down the side 
and put it in. 
Q. On top of the fuse and the cap? 
A. Yes. 
7 
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Q. Then what is the next step in the opera-
tion, tamp it? 
A. Yes, tamp it. 
Q. As I understand, the fuse is kind of stiff 
like an electric wire, isn't it? 
A. It is stiff. 
Q. And a black covered material? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And on the end of that you fasten — it is 
a copper cap, isn't it? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. That is the blasting cap? 
A. That is the blasting cap that you crimp 
on the end of it. 
Q. Then you would hook the cap around like 
a fishhook on the end? 
A. Just bend it over like a hook. 
Q. Then insert the cap on the bent end down 
to the bottom of the drill hole, is that correct? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Now, the powder comes in cartridges, 
doesn't it? What do you call the powder charge? 
A. That comes in sticks. 
8 
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Q. You call it a stick? 
A. A stick. 
Q. Those are about how long? 
A. I would say approximately around eight 
inches. 
Q. The diameter is smaller than the hole so 
it will fit down in the hole, is that right ? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Did I infer you to say you would gouge 
out the sides so it would fit around the fuse, is 
that it? 
A. What do you mean by "gouge out the 
sides"? 
Q. I don't know; you were telling me as I 
understood you — 
A. I split it and put it in the hole. 
Q. When you split it how would that be done? 
A. Just slitting each side of it — the stick 
of powder. 
Q. You mean you would break it in two like 
a pencil? 
A. No; slit it down. 
Q. What with? 
A. A pocket knife. 
9 
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Q. What would the purpose of that be? 
A. So if you tamp it it tamps better. 
Q. It loosens it up? 
A. Loosens it up so when you put it in there 
you don't force it or anything. 
Q. Then do you tamp it? 
A. Yes, tamp it. 
Q. How is that done ? 
A. With a tamping stick. 
Q. Is that a wooden stick? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. That fits down in the hole; and what does 
it do, enable you to apply pressure? 
A. You don't put much pressure, just a little 
bit down in there. 
Q. To firm it up? 
A. To firm it. 
Q. You pack it solid, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then I guess you light the fuse and get 
out of there, is that it? 
A. You have to get out. 
10 
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• • # 
Q. Now, on January 9, of 1951, you were 
working in the quarry, were you not. 
A. Yes sir. 
# # • 
Q. Shortly before the time of the accident do 
you recall what you were doing? 
A. A short time before the accident? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I was getting my stuff ready to load, 
getting my primers and powder and all that. 
Q. You were getting ready to blast one of 
these boulders, is that it ? 
A. Well, we get quite a few of them loaded. 
Q. Then you send them off at the same time, 
is that it? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Then will you just tell us in your own 
words, as far as you can remember, just what 
happened? 
A. Well, I put my blasting cap—like I told 
you—folded it, slit my powder down the sides, 
and put it in the hole; just as I put it in the hole, 
that's all I could tell; it just exploded. 
Q. Was that a full stick of dynamite ? 
A. It was a full stick. 
11 
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Q. You had put it in the hole after slitting 
it — do you slit it ? 
A. Yes, just down the sides. 
Q. You were tamping it ? 
A. No sir. 
Q. How deep was that particular hole? 
A. That was approximately around between 
8 and 12 inches. 
Q. Can you remember anything else that 
happened in connection with the accident? 
A. Just that I put it in that way; it just sur-
prised me. 
Q. Had you drilled the hole? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you remember who drilled the hole? 
A. It was one of the drillmen. 
Q. Who were the drillmen ? 
A. Harold Buchanan and Bill Harwood. 
Q. They had drilled it and gotten it ready 
for you, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You inserted the cap and the fuse, is that 
right? 
A. Yes. 
12 
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Q. Did there appear to be anything unusual 
with respect to either the cap or fuse in appear-
ance? 
A. No sir. 
Q. And then you slit with a knife the stick 
of dynamite! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did it appear to be normal, as far as you 
could observe? 
A. As far as I could observe it was normal. 
Q. Then you put the stick into the hole, is 
that right? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Are these holes vertical or horizontal! 
A. Well, we just drill them straight down. 
Q. Just drill them straight down? 
A. Yes sir, straight down; just the way your 
boulders would lay too. 
Q. Would it be fair to say in this case yon 
dropped the stick down in the hole? 
A. No; I put it in there; I didn't drop it; 
I just put it in. 
Q. You inserted i t! 
A. Yes. 
13 
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Q. And then it would drop by gravity I guess 
the balance of the way, wouldn't it, to the bottom? 
A. When you put it in there it just goes down 
itself. 
Q. You recall distinctly that you didn't tamp 
it, is that correct? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And the explosion occurred right after you 
had let go of the stick? 
A. Just when I put it in and let go; just a 
big explosion. I have never seen from that day 
on. 
Q. Mr. Matievitch, which hand do you use 
to put a stick of dynamite in one of these holes? 
A. Use my left hand. 
Q. Is the right hand holding the fuse ? 
A. Put it in with your left hand; you use 
both hands at times. 
Q. Is one hand usually holding the fuse in 
place and the other is inserting the dynamite, is 
that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is there a possibility that as you were 
inserting the dynamite you were pulling on the 
fuse with your other hand ? 
A. No; when you put your fuse in you don't 
mess around with the fuse; you just put the fuse 
in, then your dynamite. 
14 
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Q. You hold that steady, is that it? 
A. Yes, you pick up the end of the fuse and 
split the end of it when it is loaded. 
Q. I am afraid I don't understand that; I 
can see how you insert the cap on the end of the 
fuse, and you are holding it in place, is that right, 
in the hole? 
A. Just fold it and put it in your drill hole, -
the cap. 
Q. Then with your left hand you insert the 
stick of dynamite? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, are you sure this was a full stick? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Sometimes you break the stick into a 
quarter or half, don't you? 
A. Yes, it varies in different sizes of your 
boulders; you can tell by that; it varies in dif-
ferent sizes of boulders; some take a half stick, 
some a stick; some less than half. 
Q. It is your best recollection this was a 
full stick in this case, is that right? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And you inserted that with your left hand 
in the hole, is that right? 
A. Inserted the powder, yes. 
15 
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Q. Then, as I understand it, as you let go of 
the stick of dynamite, the explosion occurred! 
A, Yes sir. 
Q. Of course, Mr. Matievitch, after an ex-
plosion, including this explosion, would there be 
anything left of the cap or explosive or fuse? 
A. Oh no. 
Q. Those materials are just completely dis-
integrated, is that right? 
A. Disintegrated with the blast I guess. 
Q. Mr. Matievitch, where did you learn how 
to handle powder and to insert these charges in 
the drill holes? 
A. That was when I went up there to work, 
up to the quarry; the powder man up there that 
was on—I was taught. 
Q. By your fellow employes? 
A. By my fellow employes. 
Q. Again, who was in charge of the opera-
tion? 
A. He is gone; he is Up Above; he died. 
Q. What was his name? 
A. Bob Rukovina — you mean in charge of 
us? 
16 
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Q. Yes. 
A. He knew more about it than any of us at 
that time. 
Q. Was he around there at that time? 
A. No, he passed away. 
Q. But he is the man more than any other 
who instructed you as to how to work with 
powder ? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Did anyone ever tell you that the safe 
way to load such a charge was to insert the cap 
in the top of the stick of dynamite and then to 
insert the stick of dynamite into the hole ? 
A. No sir, nobody ever told me that; just 
what I was taught up there from their other 
powdermen. 
Q. So far as you know the standard way of 
blasting these boulders was to first insert the cap 
on the fishhook of the fuse and then the powder, 
is that right? 
A. Yes sir, put your powder in. 
Q. Then you tamp, is that right! 
A. Yes. 
THE WITNESS: Sometimes I don't get you, 
what you say. You will have to excuse me. 
MR. BEHLE: I appreciate that. That is 
why I want you to feel free to add anything here 
to the story because we are just trying to find 
out what happened. 
17 
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Q. Have you any idea as to what caused this 
explosion? 
A. Just by putting my powder in, and that 
explosion; that's all I could say on it. 
Q. You knew, of course, that explosives are 
inherently dangerous? I mean they have to be 
handled carefully; you knew that ? 
A. Oh yes. 
Q. And you don't know of anything on this 
day that you did that was out of the ordinary? 
A. No sir. 
Q. In your experience out there had there 
ever been another unexpected explosion ? 
A. Well, not the way I had it. 
Q. Who had charge of the explosives — the 
supply? 
A. Well, that was left to us; we had the keys, 
—the powdermen. 
Q. You had the keys to the powder room? 
A. Yes. 
Q. These sticks of dynamite come in cases, 
don't they? 
A. Yes, cases. 
Q. Would you unpack those cases? 
A. When we go to use the dynamite we would 
unpack them. 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. Each case has a set of instructions in it, 
has it not? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Did you ever read those instructions! 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. But, again, no one ever told you that it 
was a dangerous practice to drop the dynamite 
on top of the fishhook fuse and cap! 
A. No sir. 
Q. In the years of working up there you 
never followed the practice of inserting the cap 
in the stick of dynamite and fastening it on and 
then putting the stick of dynamite in the hole ? 
A. Well, they laced powder up there when 
the holes are a lot deeper, where you have to go 
quite a ways down, they have always laced that 
way. 
Q. But not in your blasting of these boulders! 
A. No, they wouldn't do it that way. Some-
times the holes varied; some are deeper you know. 
Q. On some of the deeper holes you have 
laced the powder! 
A. That was when you had the long holes, as 
if you were shooting underground and had three 
or four feet—(then you) have to lace the powder; 
couldn't force the cap in a hole like that. We 
never do force caps anyway, though. 
19 
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Q. Then, again, the way you have described 
is the way during all these years you inserted the 
powder charge into the drill holes of these 
boulders ? 
A. That is how they done it all the time when 
they were drilling boulders; that is how they 
loaded. 
Q. Are you working now? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Did you tell me how old you were ? I think 
you said thirty-nine. 
A. Thirty-nine. 
Q. Married? 
A. No sir. 
MK. BEHLE: Do you have any questions? 
MR. RICH: I have no questions. 
MR. BEHLE: 
Q. Anything more you want to say Mr. 
Matievitch? 
A. That is all I could say. 
Q. That tells the story fairly and completely, 
as best you know ? 
A. To the best of my knowledge. 
MR. BEHLE: Thanks very much, as we ap-
preciate your coming up here. 
20 
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(Off the record) 
MB. BEHLE: 
Q. At the time of the explosion do yon recall 
where your tamping stick was ? 
A. No, I couldn't tell you that. 
Q. I thought you said while we were off the 
record that it was under your left arm. 
A. You said after the explosion? 
Q. I say at the time of the explosion. 
A. It was under my left arm. 
Q. Under your left arm? 
A. Yes. I thought you meant after the ex-
plosion. 
Q. So you are sure that you were not tamping 
at the time of the explosion ? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Tamping would have been the next step, 
is that right? 
A. Yes, that would have been the next step 
after putting the powder in. 
Q. Then do you use sand to hold the fuse in 
place, or just tamp? 
A. Just tamp. 
Q. These fuses are not electrically operated, 
are they? 
A. No sir. 
21 
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Q. Do you use a match! 
A. Yes, we have a spitter. 
Q. That sets of f a series I 
A. Yes; that keeps spitting your fire out and 
you touch your ends to it. 
Q. Where was Mr. Harwood at the time of 
the explosion, do you recall? 
A. He was there drilling. 
Q. Was he one of your crew? 
A. He was one of the crew, yes sir. 
Q. How big was the boulder, do you recall? 
A. I would say approximately between 400 
and 500 pounds. 
Q. How high would that stand? 
A. I couldn't recall how high it stands. 
Q. Well about? Would that be the height of 
a man? 
A. Well, that was over there with them 
others; I couldn't tell how high it would stand. 
Q. Would you have to get up on top of it? 
A. No, I didn't get on top of it. 
Q. Again, you state that it was a full stick? 
A. Yes sir. 
22 
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Q. And that you had not tamped! 
A. No sir. 
4. The foregoing deposition of plaintiff thus reveals 
his failure to follow the manufacturer's instruction as to 
use of the inherently dangerous product. These instruc-
tions stated (reference is also made to the illustrations) 
as follows (B. 13): 
PBIMING: When blasting caps are used, the 
proper length of fuse should be cut from the roll 
and the blasting cap crimped to the fresh cut end 
of the fuse with a cap crimper, not with a knife 
or with the teeth. Be sure that the fuse is cut 
square across and that the end is pushed gently 
against the explosive material in the blasting cap. 
Do not twist the fuse inside the cap. The crimp 
in the blasting cap should be made near the end 
through which the fuse enters. In wet work, the 
joint between the fuse and cap should be made 
thoroughly waterproof. 
Punch a hole about the size of a lead pencil 
either in the end or side of the cartridge, this hole 
to be a little deeper than the length of the blast-
ing cap. Insert the blasting cap and fasten the 
fuse securely to the dynamite cartridge to prevent 
the cap and fuse being pulled out of the dynamite 
cartridge. Aim to keep the blasting cap axially in 
the center of the cartridge. See Figs. 1 and 2. 
(Illustrations omitted) 
II. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. There was no genuine issue of material fact in 
this case. 
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2. Res ipsa loquitur does not here apply. 
3. Plaintiff was not denied opportunity to present his 
contentions below. 
ARGUMENT 
1. There was no genuine issue of material fact in 
this case. 
While the cause of plaintiff's accident remains in 
question, it will be seen from the statement of the record 
below that the basic facts with respect to what had oc-
curred were simply not in dispute. The real issue below, 
as well as here, was one of law as applied to these un-
disputed facts. 
By this action plaintiff undertook the burden of 
proof to establish that the defendant was negligent in 
some respect in connection with the manufacture of a 
particular one of the hundreds of thousands of blasting 
caps or dynamite sticks which defendant has produced 
at its various plants. These caps, packed in bulk with 
instructions as to use, as well as the dynamite, are dis-
tributed throughout the world through wholesale and 
retail outlets, and far beyond defendant's control. 
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To meet this burden of proof and in the admitted 
absence of any evidence, plaintiff in effect urges this 
court to promulgate a rule of law that in the event of any 
explosion, the manufacturer of any of the components 
contributing to the explosion must permit a jury to 
speculate as to the cause of the accident. This of course 
is not the law of negligence, but is a doctrine of absolute 
manufacturer's liability for all practical purposes. 
a. In addition to urging this rule of law, discussed 
hereinafter, plaintiff would support his case by permit-
ting an expression of raw opinion by an alleged "expert" 
as to cause. 
Attention is invited to the details of Rudelich's gra-
tuitous conclusion as an old powderman that this parti-
cular accident, occurring in a hazardous occupation where 
any number of factors may have caused the accident, 
was due to faulty manufacture. A reading of this affida-
vit (R. 20 to 22) discloses not only the incompetence of 
the powderman to express an opinion as to manufacture, 
but that its use is simply fantastic as a substitute for 
competent factual evidence of negligent manufacture. 
We are even left to speculate as to whether the negligent 
manufacture was as to the blasting cap, or as to the dy-
namite. 
The affidavit is the equivalent of plaintiff's in a 
motor vehicle case expressing his raw personal opinion 
that he was not negligent, but that the defendant was. 
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Of course these are the very matters which the trier of 
the facts is to determine, assuming competent evidence 
raises a dispute of fact which requires determination. 
It will be noted that Rudelich's affidavit avers no-
thing whatsoever with respect to any "special knowledge, 
skill, experience or training" in the manufacture of ex-
plosives, as required by Rule 402 of the Model Code of 
Evidence. This rule merely re-states the well settled law; 
and since the fact at issue was defendant's alleged negli-
gence in the manufacture of its products, the rejection 
by the lower court of this affidavit was obviously under-
standable. Rule 56 (e) requires such affidavits to "set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence", and 
also establish that affiant was "competent to testify to 
the matters stated therein." Accordingly, the conclusions 
of such affidavit, although under oath, are worth no more 
than the bare assertion by counsel in the complaint, 
under his professional certificate, that the explosion was 
due to defendant's negligence. Neither per se is the 
equivalent of the evidence necessary to support such a 
charge; and the burden of establishing these charges by 
competent evidence rests upon plaintiff, not defendant. 
b. Nor can an issue raised in the pleadings be suffi-
cient to raise a genuine issue of fact for the purposes of 
the summary judgment procedure, when the evidence is 
set forth under oath in competent affidavit or deposition 
form. Plaintiff's contention (page 8) that an issue in 
the pleadings per se constitutes a genuine issue would 
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of course destroy the efficacy of motions under Rule 56 
and defeat the purpose of the procedure. Engl v. Aetna 
Life Ins. Co., 139 F . 2d 469, 473; Rule 56, note subdivision 
(e) page 50, May 8, 1954 Report of Advisory Committee 
on Rules for Civil Procedure of the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 
If there is a genuine issue of fact, admittedly the 
motion for summary judgment should be denied. Young 
v. Pelornia, Utah , 244 P. 2d 862; although 
the order pursuant to section (d) of Rule 56 should pro-
ceed to cover appropriate pretrial matters. 
c. Nor, as plaintiff contends (page 9), are theories 
the equivalent of the competent evidence necessary to 
create genuine fact issues. Plaintiff is still free to pre-
sent and argue whatever theories were proper below 
under the facts. His trouble is the absence of facts to 
support his averment, first, that defendant negligently 
manufactured a product, and secondly, that this negli-
gence in manufacture was the proximate cause of plain-
tiff's injuries. Of course if such negligence and causation 
are proved, there would be liability under the rules quoted 
by plaintiff from the Restatement in 2 Torts A.L.I. § § 
388 et seq. 
In this connection it might be well to reiterate that 
negligence in manufacture is here the basis of plaintiff's 
cause of action. I t is not breach of warranty, as in Park 
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v. Moorman, or negligence in warning as to use, which 
was the cause of action in the Hopkins case and in other 
cases relied upon in plaintiff's brief. 
Counsel appears to misconstrue or misunderstand 
the function of the summary judgment procedure, which 
is designed for situations such as this where competent 
evidence as to the material facts is either lacking, or is 
not in dispute. In either case, there remains nothing for 
the trier of facts to determine, since there is no issue as 
to the material facts. With the expedition afforded by 
the summary judgment procedure, the legal questions 
can be determined without the delay, expense and in-
convenience otherwise resulting in calling the case for 
trial, impaneling a jury, permitting witnesses such as 
plaintiff to testify, and then determining the matter on 
a proper motion for a directed verdict. 
I • . 
The genuine issue in this case still remains the legal 
one of whether or not res ipsa loquitur could be invoked 
as a rule of law under the undisputed facts of this ac-
cident. If so, admittedly a jury question would be pre-
sented; if not, the summary judgment was proper, for 
otherwise no genuine issue of fact was in this case. 
I 
28 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. Res ipsa loquitur does not here apply. 
No one here questions the propriety of the court's 
extension of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to fact-
situations of a modern world. This is the strength of the 
common law. 
a. One may not under certain conditions expect a 
properly manufactured and installed water pipe to burst, 
a new tire to explode upon inflation, or a bottle of bever-
age to explode, without the probability of negligence on 
the part of the manufacturer or producer, any more than 
we would expect electricity to cause damage to a pedes-
trian or a street lamp to fall upon him, etc., etc., without 
the probability of negligence on the part of the persons 
in control of these various instrumentalities. 
Throughout all such fact-situations, and as said by 
courts and text writers everywhere, for the occurrence 
itself to bespeak of negligence on the part of those in 
control, the accident must be the kind that ordinarily does 
not occur in the absence of negligence; and the accident 
must be caused by an agency or instrumentality still 
within the exclusive practical control of the party charged 
with negligence. The basis of the doctrine and quotations 
from cases and the texts with respect to its application 
to a particular case have been reiterated time and time 
again by this court; e.g., Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co., 117 Utah 578, 218 P 2d 660. 
In sharp contrast to fact-situations where the doc-
trine has been applied as a matter of law to raise an 
inference of negligence, is the situation pertaining to the 
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blasting cap. In its very nature it is inherently explosive; 
its use is not in the control of the manufacturer. News 
stories over the years unfortunately have been and still 
are replete with reports of boys injured while trespassing 
and playing with caps, and of accidents from explosives 
to workmen such as plaintiff. The reported causes are 
almost invariably carelessness on the par t of persons 
handling these sensitive caps, rather than negligence in 
their production. The instrumentalities exploded, just 
as they were designed to do. 
Society's remedy—admittedly as inadequate in one 
sense to the injured as are monetary damages in any 
personal injury case, is the coverage apart from negli-
gence of workmen's compensation laws, plus safety laws 
and inspections to prevent such tragedies as occurred to 
plaintiff in the course of his employment. 
b. Here the record is silent concerning not only the 
manufacture of this particular cap and dynamite by de-
fendant, but also as to the progress of these products 
from the point of manufacture and packing in cases and 
boxes with instructions. We pick up the trail long after, 
when plaintiff is reported to have selected the particular 
cap and dynamite stick from the powderhouse of the 
employer. 
We do know that plaintiff alone was in control of 
the operation. I t was plaintiff who placed the blasting 
materials in the particular drill hole. Also we know that 
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unfortunately the plaintiff was not following the manu-
facturer's explicit instructions as to priming the charge. 
His method of loading reminds one of another old hard-
rock miner's practice: crimping the blasting cap onto the 
fuses with his teeth. The reasons for abandonment of 
both practices—tooth-crimping, and dropping the dy-
namite stick down the drill hole on top of the previously 
inserted cap and fuse—are the same: sad experience 
with the older and more primitive methods simply re-
sulted in too many accidents of the very type which oc-
curred in this case. 
It matters not that in plaintiff's opinion (R. 38) or 
in the instructions of his old-time teacher Rukovina (Ii. 
37) or that in the opinion of "expert" Rudelich (E. 21), 
the practice of first inserting the cap on its fishhook fuse 
could be done without causing an explosion. Experience 
had demonstrated—at least to others—that to permit 
contact of the sensitive detonator against the hard-rock 
substances of the drill holes might and probably here did 
cause an accident. 
If anything, the fact-situation which we have in this 
case bespeaks of plaintiff's own negligence as the person 
in control, carelessly failing to follow instruction issued 
by the manufacturer as to the particular products; and 
not that defendant was negligent in the manufacture 
of a product which exploded in the course of the very 
work for which the product was designed, and in a man-
ner of use for which warning was given. 
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c> That res ipsa loquitur does not apply to fact-
situations pertaining to explosion of dynamite caps in 
cases comparable to plaintiff's, are the following: 
35 C.J.S. § 11—EXPLOSIVES: 
The mere explosion of dynamite caps car-
ries with it no presumption of negligence on the 
part of the manufacturer or seller, and the injured 
person has the burden of proving that the manu-
facturer or seller was guilty of the negligence 
charged, particularly where such explosive is not 
under the exclusive control of defendant. Simi-
larly, in an action against the manufacturer of 
a powder fuse for injuries resulting to a purchaser 
from a delayed explosion, plaintiff has the bur-
den of proving defendant's negligence. However, 
in a minor plaintiff's action based on defendant's 
unlawful sale of a torpedo to him, he is not re-
quired to prove that the torpedo contained a dan-
gerous and explosive substance, within the statute. 
See also 22 Am. Jur., Explosions and Explosives, §§ 73 
and 95. 
Sierocinski v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 118 
F. 2d 531, was a dynamite cap case where the explosion 
occurred upon crimping. There the United States Court 
of Appeals affirmed the District Court below, which, re-
fused to apply res ipsa loquitur in the following words: 
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•• * * Here, the defendant was not in control 
of the instrumentality which inflicted the injury. 
The custody and manner of using the cap was in 
the exclusive control of the plaintiff. While the 
defendant's manufacture of the cap was admitted, 
what the circumstances of its storage and care 
had been from the time it left the defendant's pos-
session until the plaintiff's employer purchased it 
was not traced. Proof of manufacture was not 
sufficient to impute continued control to the de-
fendant. See Zahniser et al v. Pennsvlvania Tor-
pedo Co., Ltd., 190 Pa, 350, 353, 42 A. 707. In 
fact, the plaintiff's proof did not exclude the 
possibility of intervening fault (occurring between 
the time the Magnesia Company received the cap 
and the time the plaintiff took it from the storage 
magazine for use) for which the defendant would 
not be responsible. What the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania said in Eucinski v. Colin, 297 Pa. 
105, 115, 146 A. 445, 448, where the defendant was 
out of control of the instrumentality, is apposite 
here, "it would extend the rule of responsibility 
to unwarranted lengths and make it virtually that 
of res ipsa loquitur to sustain a recovery under 
the facts as here shown." 
It will be remembered that plaintiff's failure to 
follow the manufacturer's instructions as to method of 
priming might here speculatively have been the cause of 
the accident. The Sierocinski case above is also pertinent 
in this connection, the court saying: 
But even if the evidence warranted a finding 
that the defendant's original control had been 
unbroken down to the time of the accident, neither 
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the rule of res ipsa loquitur nor the doctrine of 
exclusive control was available to the plaintiff. 
There is evidence in the plaintiff's case from 
which it could be reasonably inferred that the ac-
cident happened in a manner for which the de-
fendant was not blameable. One of the plaintiff's 
witnesses, who was 50 to 75 feet from the scene at 
the time of the accident, testified that there were 
two explosions. Another witness, who came to 
the scene immediately after the accident, testified 
to finding the crimpers undamaged lying on the 
top of the "Day magazine" and also some cut 
fuses; that he found three fuses with exploded 
caps and a like number with unexploded caps 
hanging on nearby bushes; that physical evidences 
of the explosion were found on the ground 9 feet 
from the "day magazine"; and that the plaintiff 
had then said that he had had seven or eight fuse 
caps in his hand just prior to the accident. The 
plaintiff himself testified that the great toe of 
his left foot was blown off although protected 
by a heavy working shoe and that he also suffered 
injuries to his legs, chest, arms, throat and face. 
In these circumstances, an inference that the acci-
dent was precipitated by the plaintiff's stepping 
upon a cap while bending over to recover some 
dropped caps wrould not have been unreasonable. 
The matter for consideration in this connection 
is not the choosing of one inference against an-
other. Credibility is not for the court. The thing 
of importance is that an inference exculpating the 
defendant from, guilt could also he reasonably 
drawn from the evidence. That, of itself, is suffi-
cient to prevent the application of res ipsa loqui-
tur or the doctrine of exclusive control. As was 
said in Coralnick v. Abbotts Dairies, 337 Pa. 344, 
345, 11 A. 2d 143, 144, "There being causes ap-
parent, other than those within defendant's con-
trol, to which the accident might with equal fair-
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ness be attributed, the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur does not apply." And, the same has been said 
as to the inapplicability of the doctrine of exclu-
sive control. Zahniser et al v. Pennsylvania Tor-
pedo Co., Ltd., supra, 190 Pa. at page 353, 42 A. 
707. See also Norris v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 
supra, 334 Pa. at page 165, 5 A. 2d 114, and Clark 
v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 336 Pa. 75, 
80, 6 A. 2d 892. 
Finally, the Federal Court opinion had this to say with 
respect to alleged breach of warranty: 
The appellee argues on this appeal, apparent-
ly for the first time, that the judgment may be 
sustained on the basis of a breach of warranty 
by the defendant. Aside from no relation having 
been shown to support a warranty by the defend-
ant in favor of the plaintiff, the case was pleaded, 
tried and submitted on the ground of alleged neg-
ligence. The plaintiff having failed to sustain the 
burden of proving negligence either directly or 
circumstantially, the defendant was entitled to an 
affirmance of its request for a directed verdict. 
This court has had occasion to deal with faulty op-
eration of fuse cases in the appeal of Buhler v. Maddison, 
105 Utah 39, 140 P. 2d 933. We quote as follows: 
*** Plaintiff continued to use the same fuse. 
On July 2, 1941, he placed a charge of dynamite 
in a hole in the tunnel to which he attached the 
primer—a piece of fuse about 14 inches in length 
with the cap attached. He lighted the fuse and he 
and Kay then retired a safe distance and waited 
35 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from 5 to 8 minutes for the charge to explode, 
but hearing no explosion, he believed the fuse 
had stopped burning before reaching the cap and 
the dynamite. He entered the cross-cut which con-
stituted the approach to the tunnel to pick up a 
length of fuse to make a new primer, when the 
charge exploded, hurling rocks and dirt, causing 
facial injuries and the loss of his left eye, as well 
as body bruises. 
To recover under any theory of common law 
negligence, the evidence must be sufficient to rea-
sonably justify the jury in finding that defendant 
was guilty of negligence which proximately caused 
plaintiff's injuries, and that plaintiff was not 
guilty of contributory negligence, and that he did 
not assume the risk here involved. The only negli-
gence alleged is that defendant furnished plaintiff 
with defective fuse. Plaintiff concedes that he 
discovered that the fuse had been wet and that it 
was slow burning, when he first came to the Lone 
Pine claims, and that he conducted experiments 
which demonstrated that certain parts burned 
more slowly than others; also that at times the 
fuse burned out before the fire reached the charge, 
although he had only 3 or 4 umissed holes" or 
shots. However, in each case when a charge failed 
to explode prior to the time of the accident, he 
waited from 15 to 20 minutes before going into 
the tunnel to set a new primer. He also admitted 
he was aware of the safety regulations of both 
Utah and Nevada which forbid going into a tun-
nel or other area where a charge has been set until 
45 minutes after the time when it normally should 
have exploded. In this case he waited only 5 to 
8 minutes, and went into a place of known danger 
where a substantial charge of dynamite had been 
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connected with a fuse which he left burning. He 
knew the fuse was defective in that there was de-
layed burning, and that in any event a state safety 
regulation prohibited any approach of said danger 
zone for 45 minutes. Even if the employer was 
guilty of negligence in furnishing such slow-burn-
ing fuse, it would be unreasonable to find that 
plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence 
under such circumstances. Thus, under the com-
mon law doctrince of negligence and contributory 
negligence, plaintiff cannot recover. 
Ensign-Bickford Co. v. Reeves, 95 F. 2d 190, is an-
other fuse case. In holding that a directed verdict should 
have been sustained for want of substantial testimony 
for the plaintiff, the United States Court of Appeals 
said: 
The use of such fuse as is here in question 
is to convey fire to the charge of explosive slowly 
and in approximately measurable time, allowing 
the workmen opportunity to retire to a safe dis-
tance. The fuse is not itself dangerous to life or 
limb and one who manufactures and sells such 
fuse is not an insurer of the product. Cf. Amason 
v. Ford Motor Co., 5 Cir., 80 F. 2d 265. The law 
requires him to use care in making it and inspect-
ing it which is commensurate with the dangers in-
volved in its intended use. Davlin v. Henry Ford 
& Son, 6 Cir., 20 F. 2d 317; Dupont De Nemours 
& Co. v. Baridon, 8 Cir., 73 F. 2d 26; Favo v. Rem-
ington Arms Co., 67 App. Div. 414, 73 N.Y.S. 788. 
But absent any showing that his machinery, mate-
rials, designs or methods were faulty or that he 
had failed to use proper care, he cannot be held 
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liable for such an occurrence as the plaintiff has 
described in his testimony. If it be assumed that 
the plaintiff's testimony as to how the accident 
happened was true, and if it be further assumed 
that there was one very small piece out of the 
many millions of feet of defendant's fuse which 
had the defect of hanging fire for 15 minutes and 
then conveying the spark to the powder charge, 
such facts are not in themselves sufficient to con-
vict defendant of actionable negligence toward 
the plaintiff. The burden of proof was upon the 
plaintiff to establish that the defendant was guilty 
of some lack of due care, that it did something 
or failed to do something which prudence forbade 
or required and which was the proximate cause 
of the injuries. 
We think the cases cited are not applicable to 
the facts in this case. Whether actionable negli-
gence is shown must always depend upon the cir-
cumstances of the particular case. It must be de-
termined from the peculiar facts whether taking 
that view of the evidence most favorable to the 
plaintiff it can be fairly inferred that the defend-
ant has put out a dangerously defective article 
as a result of the lack of due care on its part. In 
the cases cited there was sufficient proof of negli-
gence. Here such proof was lacking even if it be 
assumed that a powder gap in the fuse was the 
cause of a delayed explosion which injured the 
plaintiff. 
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3. Plaintiff was not denied opportunity to present 
his contentions below. 
It is simply not true, as appellant now suggests to 
the court in his brief (pp. 6, 9, 10) that he was denied 
the opportunity to raise a genuine issue of fact before 
the court below. 
Plaintiff's deposition was taken May 19, 1954 (R. 
24-44). There was full opportunity to cross examine, 
and plaintiff said the deposition told the story "fairly 
and completely," to the best of his knowledge. (R. 40) 
Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment sup-
ported by the Early affidavit and this deposition on June 
7, 1954 (R. 8 to 13). Plaintiff filed his own affidavit on 
June 17th (R. 15 to 17). Oral argument was held June 
18, 1954 (R, 14). Plaintiff filed further affidavits Aug-
ust 21st (R. 20-22). Written briefs were submitted, and 
the court made its decision October 1, 1954 (R. 45). 
While plaintiff designated the entire record below 
to be brought before this court (R. 47), there has been 
omitted the oral argument and the briefs, from which 
it would be painfully clear that counsel was permitted 
every opportunity to present his contentions and to raise 
any material issue of fact that might genuinely and 
honestly exist. 
However, the record before the court is nevertheless 
clear on this point. Plaintiff cannot now assert that he 
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was foreclosed from properly presenting his case below. 
For the purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment 
it is obvious that ample opportunity was afforded him so 
to do. The only issue properly before this court is the 
legal question of whether the court committed error by 
entering summary judgment on the state of the record 
as the parties made it below in connection with defend-
ant's motion. 
Plaintiff's true position, and the drastic proposal 
he is making to this court, is succinctly stated on pages 
28 and 29 of his brief when he poses this question: 
''Again, why should not the * * * manufacturer of explo-
sives * * * be required to establish, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, his freedom from negligence?" 
Among the many answers to this radical proposal are 
these: 
a. Plaintiff, entirely apart from any theory of 
negligence, has already been compensated by his em-
ployer under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the 
injuries he incurred in the course of his employment. 
b. Under the Anglo-American system of justice, 
from time immemorial it has been left to the accuser to 
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prove his charges. Why not also change to the Con-
tinental system of requiring the accused in a criminal 
case to disprove charges against him I 
c. Res Ipsa Loquitur is the common law doctrine 
designed to assist a plaintiff in meeting his burden of 
proof in circumstances where experience under the par-
ticular facts indicates both the probability of negligence 
on the part of the defendant, and where defendant in con-
trol is in the position reasonably to assume the burden 
of going forward with the evidence as to just what was 
the cause of the accident, if indeed it was not due to his 
own negligence. This doctrine with all its adaptability to 
modern life in proper cases has been thought just and 
fair to all concerned, by raising as a matter of law the 
inference of defendant's negligence when plaintiff has 
proceeded to establish the facts requisite to the creation 
of such inference as a matter of law. 
d. Such a radical departure from our system of 
law as plaintiff suggests should at least come by legis-
lative action rather than by judicial revolution. 
e. As a practical matter the proposal amounts to a 
rule of absolute liability. Properly presented with con-
flicting evidence, by and large the jury is still the best 
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medium we know to sit and weigh out the truth. Plain-
tiff's proposal, however, in essence does not involve 
determination of facts, but of liability, placing a premium 
on appeal to the emotions. 
At least absolute liability would avoid what amounts 
to a speculative guess by the jury. 
Also at this point we invite the court's attention to 
the fact that the record below is silent in connection with 
two matters which plaintiff's brief asserts were before 
the court: 
a. On page 5 plaintiff states that "the plaintiff pre-
pared the caps himself and opened the original package 
containing the dynamite and the powder caps and they 
were both in the original packages, still sealed as they 
came from the manufacturer." 
h. Counsel states that evidence would "show that 
caps or dynamite manufactured in the usual manner and 
standard could not be made to explode under the circum-
stances in this case. (Brief page 6) 
This simply is not the record before the court be-
low. 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the evidence below was not in dispute, and the 
facts in this case were not such as to bespeak of negli-
gence on the part of defendant as the manufacturer of 
the particular blasting cap and dynamite handled by 
plaintiff, it is respectfully submitted that Summary 
Judgment of no cause of action was properly made and 
entered in this cause. 
C. C. PARSONS, 
A. D. MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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